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Forging autonomy in a unitary state: the Åland Islands in Finland 
 
Eve Hepburn (University of Edinburgh) 
 
As one of the most stable unitary states in the world, Finland has largely been overlooked 
in the literature on multi-level political systems. However, this categorization of Finland 
neglects the substantial autonomy that has been fought for, and accorded to, the Swedish-
speaking Åland Islands over the twentieth century. Åland is the only province that has 
been granted significant legislative powers vis-à-vis the Autonomy Act (1920) and 
thereby constitutes a federalized arrangement. It possesses its own regional assembly and 
executive with extensive powers, and elects a single representative to the Finnish 
Parliament. As Finnish parties do not compete on the island, this has led to a vertical 
disconnect between Finnish and Åland governments, straining relations between the two. 
This article will explore the implications of Åland’s autonomy arrangements for the 
coordination of intergovernmental relations within the centralized Finnish state. 
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Introduction 
Finland has largely been overlooked in the literature on multi-level political systems. 
This is largely because Finland constitutes one of the most stable unitary states in the 
world. Despite the creation of regional administrative structures to implement EU 
Regional Policy in the mid-1990s, Finland ultimately lacks an ‘independent 
administrative meso-level’ (Kull, 2009: 22). Regional self-government has been a low 
concern in a country built around a strong central state and thriving municipalities.  
However, this categorisation of Finland as a highly centralised, unitary state 
that lacks ‘real regions’ (Ryynänen 2003) neglects the status of a territorially 
concentrated and distinct population that possess a substantial degree of autonomy. 
The Swedish-speaking Åland Islands – an archipelago located in the northern Baltic 
Sea – are the smallest and wealthiest province in Finland, and the only one that has 
been granted significant legislative powers. Despite having a population of only 
27,000, Åland enjoys many of the trappings of sovereign statehood, with its own 
national flag, postage stamps, and citizenship laws. Thanks to a decree by the League 
of Nations in 1920, Åland’s Home Rule is guaranteed by both Finnish and 
international law, and can only be altered with Åland’s approval.  
Åland’s constitutionally embedded autonomy enables us to classify Åland 
within the ‘federalized’ box of cases examined within this Special issue. Åland’s 
Autonomy Acts (1920, 1951, 1991) guarantee a non-hierarchical form of ‘partnership’ 
with Finland, whereby Åland can veto any competence transfer away from it. In other 
words, Åland is able to escape the constitutional uncertainty of its powers being 
revoked, as so happens in the case of ‘regionalized’ states which endure a hierarchical 
relationship with the centre. However, because Finland has not decentralized powers 
to other regions, Åland is very much an autonomous ‘loner’ in the Finnish unitary 
 3 
state. As there are no structures of shared rule, and no scope for multilateral 
negotiation, Åland’s relations with Finland are conducted on a bilateral basis.  
The special situation of a substate unit possessing constitutionally protected 
autonomy, but without a guarantee of shared rule at the centre, has led some scholars 
to create a new type of federalized relationship: a federacy. According to Stepan et al 
(2011), ‘a federacy is a political-administrative unit in an independent unitary state 
with exclusive power in certain areas, including some legislative power, 
constitutionally or quasi-constitutionally embedded, that cannot be changed 
unilaterally and whose inhabitants have full citizenship rights in the otherwise unitary 
state.’ The main point here is that federacies are forged within unitary states and do 
not affect the constitutional nature of the rest of the state, unlike federations. 
Interestingly, federacies occur overwhelmingly in islands and archipelagos (Hepburn, 
2012), and the Åland Islands are no exception. 
The Autonomy Act (1991) that governs the relations between Åland and 
Finland is a federal-like agreement that sets out the powers that fall within the 
exclusive authority of Åland, and powers that remain under the domain of Finland. As 
such, the Act ensures Åland’s constitutionally guaranteed autonomy, which can only 
be amended by a two-third majority of both the Åland and Finnish Parliaments; it 
cannot be unilaterally altered or revoked. The citizens of Åland enjoy full citizenship 
rights in the state, can vote in statewide elections and elect a representative to the 
Finnish parliament. Finland also has a representative in Åland who helps coordinate 
activities that fall under state powers. Any Finnish laws or policies that pertain to 
Åland in any way must be explicitly approved by the Åland authorities and if Finland 
considers a bill that will have an impact on Åland (such as EU membership), Åland 
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has a right to present its views and may exercise an opt-out or veto. In other words, it 
is necessary for Finland to gain Åland’s consent before it signs international treaties.  
Åland’s special federalized status within the otherwise unitary Republic of 
Finland raises interesting questions when considering the effect of the constitutional 
structures on the coordination of intergovernmental relations (IGR). This article will 
test the governing hypotheses laid out in the Introduction of this Special Issue.  
First, it will examine the dominant mode of coordination that shapes 
intergovernmental relations between Åland and Finland. Here it is expected that, 
while Åland clearly falls into the ‘federalized’ box, which might otherwise indicate 
reliance on the use of multilateral structures, the special federacy relationship Åland 
has within the unitary Finnish state means that IGR are conducted on a formal 
bilateral basis that reflects the non-hierarchical partnership between the units.  
Second, the article will examine the patterns of formal competence allocation 
over time. In this case, it is assumed that Åland’s constitutionally guaranteed status 
ensures a degree of constitutional protection and ‘lock-in’ on an asymmetrical basis 
(i.e. there are no other autonomous units in Finland to allocate competences to).  
Third, the article examines the extent to which party-political differences 
dominate the nature of governmental coordination. Because there is no constitutional 
hierarchy in the system, it is expected that there is little risk in playing out party 
incongruence or engaging in partisan conflict, as there is no possibility that Finland 
can ‘retaliate’ by suspending self-rule or taking back competences from Åland. In 
addition, because Åland parties are separate from Finnish parties, this will result in 
complete incongruence in governing coalitions, so that party ‘connections’ cannot be 
used as an informal lubricant of IGR. 
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Research findings draw on a series of interviews conducted with Åland 
politicians, government officials and academics in June 2010, as well as primary and 
secondary literature, party documents and newspaper articles. 
  
Finnish unitarism and Åland’s special status 
Finland is one of the youngest states in Western Europe. Following six centuries as 
part of the Swedish Empire, Finland became an autonomous Grand Duchy within the 
Russian Empire in 1809, and won its independence during the Russian Revolution in 
1917. Finland’s heritage is reflected in its constitution, which acknowledges the 
country’s two national languages – Finnish and Swedish – though Swedish is only 
spoken by about 5.5% of the population, mainly in the coastal areas and Åland.  
Following in the Nordic tradition of administrative governance, Finland can be 
categorised as a decentralised unitary state (Loughlin, 2000). Since achieving 
independence in 1917, Finland has combined strong central powers in Helsinki with a 
flourishing system of local government. Since the 1960s, municipalities have been 
endowed with a wide range of statutory responsibilities for providing welfare services 
to citizens, including social welfare, health, education, and environmental protection, 
in addition to tax-raising powers (Sjöblom, 2011: 243). Like many Nordic states, 
Finland lacks an elected regional tier of government; responsibilities are vested in 
municipalities, which cooperate in joint structures at the regional level (Hedegaard 
and Lindström, 1998: 14). These regional-level institutions were not created until 
1995, at which point Finland’s membership of the EU forced it to construct 
institutions at the regional level to administer and implement EU (Kull, 2009: 25). As 
a result, twenty ‘Regional Councils’ (RCs) were established in 1994, with 
responsibility for regional development and the implementation of EU policy. 
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However, the Finnish RCs are relatively weak; instead of being directly elected, they 
are comprised of municipal councillors. There has been one exceptional ‘pilot project’ 
in regional self-government in Kainuu, which was granted a democratically elected 
Regional Council in 2005 in order to combat slow economic growth (CCRE, 2004). 
However, despite some demands – in particular by Lapland (Suksi, 2011: 144) – for 
devolution to the mainland Finnish regions, the Finnish state has been resistant to this.  
While regional devolution is virtually absent on the Finnish mainland, it is 
alive and kicking in the 6,500 islands lying in the centre of the Baltic Sea: the Åland 
Islands. For over six centuries, Åland belonged to the Sweden Empire (along with 
Finland) until they were both conquered by the Russian Empire in 1809. When 
Finland declared independence in 1917, the question emerged as to whether Åland 
should fall to Finland or its Swedish motherland. The preference of the Swedish-
speaking inhabitants of Åland was secession from Finland and incorporation into 
Sweden; however the Finnish state refused to give Åland up (Ackren and Lindström, 
2012). What followed was a conflict known as the ‘Åland Question’, which set the 
Swedish-oriented Åland irredentist movement against the Finnish authorities. The 
new League of Nations was called in to decide which country the islands rightfully 
‘belonged’ to, eventually deciding that Åland should remain part of Finland but on a 
demilitarized and neutral basis, and with a degree of autonomy that protected Åland’s 
Swedish language and culture (Karlsson, 2009: 144). The League of Nations 
confirmed the autonomy of the Åland Island in 1921 (largely based on the Act on the 
Self-Government of the Åland Islands that Finland had preemptively passed in 1920), 
and the final resolution was guaranteed by international law.  
As a result of the Act on Self-Government (or ‘Autonomy Act’) of 1920, 
which was revised and extended in 1951 and 1991, Åland was granted a government, 
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legislative assembly, and a Governor who is appointed by the Finnish Government. Its 
competences have been gradually expanded over the years to include most areas of 
social policy, agriculture, the environment, policing, economic development and 
limited fiscal powers. Åland enjoys direct representation in the Nordic Council as 
well as a seat on the European Committee of the Regions, and it is entitled to send one 
representative to the Finnish Parliament in Helsinki. However, that is where Åland’s 
integration into Finland ends. Åland was never a part of the modern Finnish state: 
geographically closer to Stockholm, Åland has maintained its Swedish heritage and 
Finland has never sought to ‘integrate’ Åland into its socio-cultural or political 
structures. Åland enjoys a distinct identity, largely owing to the fact that the island is 
95% Swedish-speaking. It has developed a separate party system with no formal links 
to Finnish parties. Finally, Åland has been granted its own form of regional 
citizenship, whereby one must live there for 5 years in order to own real estate, gain 
the right to vote or stand as a parliamentary candidate (Hannum 1990: 373). 
Having provided a brief overview of Åland’s special form of autonomy within 
the decentralised unitary state of Finland, we are now in a position to test the 
hypotheses set out at the beginning of this article. 
 
Intergovernmental relations: Formalized bilateralism 
Åland’s special form of federalized relationship with Finland has particular 
implications for how intergovernmental relations are conducted. This section 
examines the first hypothesis presented: that Åland’s constitutional status results in 
formalised, bilateral interactions with Finland, rather than the multilateral form of 
negotiations typically seen in ‘traditional’ federations with multiple sub-units. To test 
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this hypothesis, we will consider the main IGR mechanisms of Ålandic representation 
in Finnish institutions and Finnish representation in Åland.  
Åland’s main representation in Finland takes the form of a single electoral 
constituency for elections to the Finnish Parliament. Åland’s MP is required to 
represent the interests of the Ålandic people in all Finnish affairs; however, they also 
informally act as an ‘ambassador for Åland in all fields’ (Interview with Roger 
Nordlund, former Premier of Åland, 15 June 2010). The responsibility of representing 
Åland in all Finnish affairs is a challenging one for a single MP in a parliament of 200 
members. To partially compensate, Åland’s MP has historically been given a position 
on the powerful Constitution Committee.  
According to all of the politicians interviewed for this research, this single seat 
in the Parliament is inadequate to have a real influence over Finnish affairs.  
Åland-specific concerns are rarely considered in the workings of the Finnish 
Parliament, and there is a lack of knowledge within Finnish political circles as to the 
nature of the Åland federacy arrangement. According to one scholar, “in many ways 
the question of Åland and the situation on Åland is not a regular part of politics in 
Finland” (Interview with Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermark, 16 June 2010). Åland issues are 
not a part of Finnish mainstream politics; like the constitutional settlement, Åland 
concerns have been effectively separated from Finland. Despite this, there are no 
demands for increased representation of Åland in Helsinki. Åland’s parties prefer to 
further increase Åland’s self-rule rather than seeking a stronger voice at the centre.  
In addition to its token MP in Helsinki, Åland may submit initiatives on 
reserved matters to the Finnish Government, which must then present them to the 
Finnish Parliament for consideration (Daftary, 2000: 17-18). This is slightly more 
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effective channel of influence in the Parliament than a single Ålandic vote on Finnish 
affairs, as it involves securing the voice of the Finnish Government.  
Finally, the most powerful means by which Åland can make its interests 
known at the Finnish level is through a special opt-out/veto that Åland enjoys in 
relation to international affairs. According to the Autonomy Act (1991, section 58), 
the Åland government may propose negotiations on a treaty with a foreign state to the 
Finnish Government. Furthermore, the Åland government should be informed of any 
international treaties negotiated by Finland that have an impact on Ålandic matters, 
and it should have an opportunity to participate in such negotiations (Åkermark, 
2009). Finally, if Finland signs an international treaty that contains any provisions that 
directly affect Åland’s sphere of competence, Finland must obtain the consent of the 
Åland regional parliament before that treaty can come into being.  
These rights of negotiation on international treaties give Åland – with its tiny 
population of 27,000 and limited representation at the ‘centre’ of Finnish politics – an 
important degree of influence on Finnish foreign affairs. This was the case when 
Finland joined the European Union in 1995, for which Finland had to obtain Åland’s 
consent and make special provisions concerning Åland’s special status. For instance, 
the Premier of the Åland Government is entitled to be heard by the Cabinet 
Committee on European Union Affairs in the Finnish Parliament on matters that fall 
within Åland’s competence or whenever matters are otherwise of particular 
importance to Åland (Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Finland, 2012). However, despite 
additional protocols to enable Åland input into Finland’s negotiating line on the EU, 
there are also significant hurdles to effective representation on European matters, 
which are discussed in the next section. 
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Turning now to Finnish representation in Åland, the primary channel of 
representation is the role of the (provincial) Governor. The Governor of Åland is 
appointed by the President of Finland following agreement with the Speaker of the 
Åland Lagting. The Governor is tasked with representing the Finnish Government and 
the President of the Republic, and is responsible for coordinating the activities of the 
Finnish State on the Åland Islands. This includes heading the State Department of 
Åland, which coordinates shared Åland—Finland strategies for monitoring language 
interests, education within the State administration, and public services. The Governor 
of Åland also occasionally acts as bilateral mediator between Åland and Finland, for 
instance by engaging in disputes about ‘overlapping’ policy areas (Åkermark, 2009). 
For legislative issues, the Governor uses the Åland Delegation to mediate disputes. 
The Åland Delegation is a joint organ of Åland and Finland. It was created in 
the first Autonomy Act in 1920 and its initial task was to calculate the sum of money 
to be transferred from Finland to Åland; today its responsibilities are much greater 
and it has developed an important dispute resolution function. (Åkermark, 2009). 
According to the Autonomy Act, all legislation passed by the Parliament of Åland 
must be approved by the President of Finland within a period of four months. The 
President may use veto powers if a law exceeds Åland’s legislative competence, or if 
it affects the security of the country. Therefore, Åland is ‘subject to clear though 
limited supervision by the centre’ (Datfary, 2000: 17), though this right remains very 
much a formality that is unused. In order to avoid a veto, before any draft legislation 
is presented to the President, it must be sent to the Åland Delegation, which reports on 
whether the Lagting has exceeded its authority when adopting legislation. This report 
is sent to the Supreme Court, which in turn sends its view to the President of Finland. 
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This Delegation has been so far effective in preventing any major disputes from 
breaking out between Åland and Finland. 
From this brief summary of Åland-Finland relations, we can surmise that IGR 
are handled on a formalized bilateral basis between Åland and Finland, which accords 
to the special nature of the Åland federacy arrangement. However, ‘the very idea of a 
partnership…which prevails in today’s debate in multi-level governance…is not 
much discussed in either Helsinki or Mariehamn’ (Karlsson, 2009: 145). This is 
primarily because there are few coordinating mechanisms--let alone opportunities for 
partnership--between Helsinki and Mariehamn. This is reflected in the paucity of 
informal relations, such as meetings between the heads of the governments. For 
instance, the Finnish PM and President both visit Åland no more than once a year, 
though there are more frequent meetings between high-level politicians (Interview 
with Olof Erland, former Deputy Premier of Åland, 15 June 2010). Åland-Finnish 
relations are therefore very much based on formalized bilateral procedures with little 
warmth between the two sides that might in other situations lead to a plethora of 
‘informal’ relations, such as linkages between civil servants, ministers and parties.  
The bilateral nature of IGR also reflects the asymmetrical form of autonomy 
granted to Åland. Because there are no equivalent federacy/autonomy arrangements 
for other regional units in Finland, there are no options available for Åland to 
influence Finnish policy-making in a multilateral way through state-regional 
machinery for IGR and joint decision-making institutions; indeed, Åland is to a great 
degree isolated within the Finnish political system. The limited nature of ‘shared-rule’ 
structures – which comprise the single seat in the Finish parliament and the existence 
of the Åland Governor and Delegation – has created challenges for the effective 
representation of Åland interests in the central bodies of the Finnish state. This lies in 
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contrast to traditional federations such as Germany and Australia, in which substate 
units enjoy a strong influence over central decision-making through a powerful 
second chamber (Swenden, 2004). Instead, the Åland autonomy institutions rely on 
their special constitutional rights to influence Finnish policy-making, such as the right 
to participate in negotiations of international treaties and to submit initiatives to the 
Finnish Parliament. However, even these generous rights are not without their 
problems, as we shall see below.  
 
Competence allocation and a growing ‘autonomy leakage’ 
As Åland is the only substate unit to be granted significant autonomy through a 
federalized relationship in Finland, competence allocation is conducted on an entirely 
bilateral and asymmetrical basis (i.e., Åland does not have to worry about vying with 
other regional units to get more competences from Finland). The Autonomy Act 
furthermore guarantees that Åland’s competences cannot be revoked without two-
thirds majorities from both Parliaments; so Åland’s autonomy is protected through the 
absence of constitutional hierarchy. This would lead up to expect that Åland’s most 
important concern is to ensure that there is continuity in maintaining the 
constitutionally protected status of Åland. Let us now test this hypothesis. 
The Act on Self-Government for the Åland Islands (or ‘Autonomy Act’) has 
been revised twice in order to meet Åland’s changing needs, by extending the 
exclusive competences allocated to Åland. This was the result of lengthy negotiations 
between the Åland and Finland governments, which then required a two-thirds 
qualified majority in both parliaments supporting the constitutional amendments. 
The original 1920 Act gave the Åland Islands extensive political and cultural 
autonomy. Åland was granted a provincial government an elected legislative 
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assembly (Lagting) with powers in the fields of education, health, culture, industry 
and policing. However, the legislative powers granted to the Lagting were allocated in 
such a way that they were residual to the enumeration of the Finnish Parliament’s 
powers, which included foreign affairs, international treaties and customs and 
taxation. As Suksi (2011: 140) notes, ‘during the first decades of the autonomy 
arrangement, [there was a] realization that with increasing treaty-making activity, the 
legislative powers of the national law-maker were increasing at the expense of the 
Åland Islands’s legislative powers’. Åland’s competences needed further protection. 
The imbalance between the powers of Åland and Finland was partially 
redressed in a second Autonomy Act of 1951. Unlike the 1920 version, the 1951 Act 
listed the exclusive competencies of both the Åland and the Finnish parliaments, so 
the former was not residual to the latter. Furthermore, the 1951 Act extended Åland’s 
competences in new areas, including social welfare, housing, municipalities, public 
order, the postal service, radio and television, farming, forestry, agriculture, fishing, 
the environment and mining rights (Palmgren 1997). Åland was furthermore granted a 
right of domicile (hembygdsrätt) to protect the local culture and Swedish language. 
This is a form of regional citizenship which is automatically granted to people born on 
the Åland Islands, and which foreigners (including Finns) may apply for after living 
in Åland for at least 5 years (Hannum, 1990: 373; Daftary, 2000: 15). However, the 
1951 Act also became quickly outdated, and Ålanders began preparations for a new 
Act in the early 1970s, which took twenty years to complete.  
The 1991 Autonomy Act regulated Åland’s economic relations with the state 
and granted it a limited degree of economic autonomy. While the Finnish government 
collected taxes, customs and duty charges in Åland, Åland received an annual lump 
sum of money which constitutes 0.45% of the state budget, over which it had 
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discretion in spending. The 1991 Act also consolidates the right of domicile by 
making fluency in Swedish a requirement for Ålandic citizenship. However, despite 
these improvements, this Act also became quickly outdated. And the primary reason 
for this was Åland’s continuing weakness in controlling Finland’s growing 
competences in the area of international affairs, in particular, Europe. 
The 1991 Act had barely entered force when Finland and Åland joined the EU 
(Suksi, 2011). When Finland became a candidate country to the EU in 1992, the 
constitution required Finland to gain Åland’s consent; therefore, Åland held a separate 
referendum on whether or not to join. Despite initial public scepticism, a clear 
majority of Ålanders voted for accession in 1994 but they also demanded that Finland 
negotiate to keep Åland’s status as a duty-free zone and special citizenship and rules. 
As a result, Åland had its own annex to Finland’s Treaty of Accession to the EU in 
1995, which were established as the ‘Åland Protocol’ (Baldacchino and Pleijel, 2010). 
The 1991 Autonomy Act was also subsequently amended, in 2004 and 2009, to 
include a new chapter on the participation of Åland in EU matters (Daftary, 2000). 
 However, while Åland gave up a great deal of its legislative power to the EU, 
in practice it gained little in return. Åland was guaranteed no representation in 
European bodies, such as the European Parliament, and only had one seat on the 
Committee of the Regions, one representative in the Finnish Permanent Mission to the 
EU in Brussels, and rights to participate in the Finnish delegation to the EU (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 2008). Soon after Finnish accession to the EU, debates took place 
in Åland about how to increase their European influence, as it became increasingly 
clear that while Åland’s competences were directly affected by EU law it had little 
power to defend its competences as it was represented by Finland.  
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This has been described as a problem of ‘autonomy leakage’, whereby there 
was a leakage of law-making competences to Europe in areas such as agriculture, 
fisheries and the environment (Suksi, 2011: 141). Moreover, Åland’s MP in Helsinki, 
Elisabeth Naclaur, argued that Åland was also “leaking competency to Helsinki” 
(Dowling, 2008). This is because Åland was leaking competences to the authorities in 
Finland in areas of EU concern as the EU only communicates with member-states. In 
response, Finland sought to compensate for Åland’s autonomy leakage by increasing 
Åland’s influence in the national preparation of EU policy (amending the Autonomy 
Act to reflect this right in 2004). Relatively speaking this method of incorporating 
Åland into the Finnish decision-making procedure was very generous. “It is very hard 
to criticize it also because they have a legal framework that is very good. If it would 
work I think it would be excellent. But it doesn’t work you know” (Interview with 
Andreas Dahlen, Head of European and External Affairs Unit, Åland Government, 16 
June 2010). Specifically, Åland’s inclusion in Finnish EU preparation doesn’t work 
because of the language barrier. Ålanders are legally obligated to communicate with 
the Finnish authorities in their own language: Swedish (section 38 of the Autonomy 
Act). However, this is a near-insurmountable barrier to communication as fewer Finns 
speak Swedish. Even though Åland is able to attend meetings of the Finnish 
Parliament, in practice “the Ålander goes to Finland but they cannot speak Finnish to 
the Finns because they have to be spoken to in Swedish. However, very few people 
actually understand what they’re saying or understand Swedish. So it’s like a Kafka 
situation, that even though there are these opportunities of representation, in practice 
they can’t say anything” (Interview with Dahlen, 16 June 2010). These linguistic 
tensions have meant that Åland is unable to exert the level of influence on Finnish EU 
policy-making that it is legally entitled to. 
 16 
 Based on this analysis of Åland-Finland competence allocation, we can see 
that two very different situations have emerged with regards to (1) Finnish 
interference with Åland’s competence and (2) European encroachment on its 
competences. With regards the former, Åland enjoys considerable constitutional 
protection and continuity in competence allocation through its federalized relationship 
with Finland. Åland’s constitutional status ensures that its existing competences are 
exclusive to Åland and are protected from encroachment from Finnish authorities. 
This ensures a degree of constitutional lock-in, by which the Autonomy Act 
guarantees Åland a veto against competence reallocation and Åland’s self-rule cannot 
be suspended or revoked by the Finnish authorities.  
Furthermore, the Autonomy Act has a degree of built-in flexibility. Firstly, 
Åland can (relatively easily), revise and extend its competences through the re-writing 
of the Autonomy Act. This has ensured the constant ‘evolution’ of the autonomy 
provisions to adapt to changing circumstances (Suksi, 2011). Secondly, there is a 
degree of flexibility built into competence (re)allocation, as some powers may be 
transferred from the State to the Åland Government or vice-versa (Lapidoth, 1997). 
For instance, Åland and Finland may (together) agree to transfer a competence that 
normally lies with the state – such as trade and shipping registers, or banking and 
credit transfers – to the Åland authorities, or vice versa (Lapidoth 1997: 73; Daftary, 
2000: 16). This is similar to the Legislative Consent (‘Sewel’) Motion in the UK, 
whereby the Scottish parliament agrees for a devolved issue to be addressed by the 
UK Parliament. In Åland, this has occurred recently when the Åland Lagting decided 
that the Finnish Parliament should have the responsibility of monitoring 
environmental issues. Therefore, the allocation of competences between Åland and 
Finland is not only protected by the constitution, is also ‘alive’ in the sense that it can 
 17 
easily be altered to accommodate changing circumstances. This confirms the 
hypothesis that Åland has an entrenched autonomy that is not under threat of being 
constitutionally revoked.  
However, this hypothesis fails when tested against Europe. Here, we have 
identified a problem of autonomy or competence ‘leakage’, due to the deepening of 
European integration. As the current Autonomy Act (1991) predates Finland’s 
membership of the EU and the greatest degree of integration following the Maastricht 
Treaty, Åland is not constitutionally protected from EU encroachment on Åland 
competences, and it has no direct channel of communication with European 
institutions. While on paper Åland has extensive participation in formulating the 
Finnish EU policy line, in reality this is severely hampered by linguistic divisions. To 
address the lack of direct representation with Europe, Åland’s political parties have 
unanimously demanded that Åland be granted its own Member of the European 
Parliament, and some parties have even boycotted European elections in their 
attempts to achieve this goal (Helsingen Sanomat, 10 June 2004). This has caused 
considerable tensions with Finland. 
 
Party Political Disconnections and Incongruence 
Political parties in states are often the forces of national integration (Detterbeck and 
Hepburn, 2010). They are responsible for aggregating and representing the interests of 
statewide electorates. Therefore, in the case that more than one party system exists 
within a state that is completely cut off from the other, this is a recipe for 
fragmentation. This is the situation in Åland, whose party system developed entirely 
separately from the Finnish party system. This section explores the third hypothesis 
put forward at the start of this article – that party incongruence in the Åland and 
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Finnish governments has little effect on intergovernmental relations, thereby enabling 
Ålandic parties to take adversarial positions without fear of having the Ålandic self-
rule revoked, and that the separate party systems means that parties cannot be used as 
an informal (back)channel of IGR.  
The Finnish political system, which emerged in the 1920s, can be described as 
a fragmented, multi-party system in which no party has ever been able to win a 
majority of seats in Parliament. As a result, governments tend to be broad coalitions 
of parties from the left and right (Arter, 2006). Finnish politics has generally been 
dominated by three main parties – the Centre Party (a centrist and agrarian party), the 
Social Democratic Party, and the National Coalition Party (a liberal-conservative 
party) – which tend to lead coalition governments. Two other parties are also notable. 
The liberal-oriented Swedish People’s Party represents the interests of the Swedish-
speaking minority in Finland, and has played a near-permanent role as a coalition 
partner in Finnish governments since 1979. Furthermore, the right-wing populist 
‘True Finns’ party achieved an electoral breakthrough in the 2011 elections, obtaining 
almost 20% of the vote and becoming Finland’s third biggest party after the National 
Coalition and SDP (BBC, 18 April 2011).  
The modern Åland party system, in contrast, only emerged in the 1960s and 
1970s with the electoral rise of a broad-based Social Democratic Party (Ålands 
Socialdemokrater). In response, a number of new parties were established on the right 
of the political spectrum to compete with the SDP; in particular the Liberals and the 
Centre Party. The 1979 election was the first evidence of a modern party system 
based on ideological grounds; prior to this Åland politics had been dominated by 
loose electoral alliances and electoral participation was low due to a continuing desire 
to be reunited with Sweden (Ackren and Lindström, 2012).  
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Åland’s parties are independent of Finnish parties, holding different names, 
ideologies and support bases. Since the 1970s, Åland politics has been dominated by 
two centrist parties: the Liberals in Åland (Liberalerna på Åland) and the centrist and 
agrarian-oriented Åland Centre (Åländsk Center), which have tended to lead coalition 
governments. The third largest party, the Åland Social Democrats, have traditionally 
formed the main Opposition, though they too have at times entered coalition 
government with their centrist rivals (see Table 3). In addition, two other parties were 
formed during the 1970s and 1980s: the Moderates of Åland (Frisinnad Samverkan) – 
a liberal-conservative political party; and the conservative Non-Aligned Coalition 
(Obunden Samling). Finally, a centre-right nationalist party, Åland’s Future (Ålands 
Framtid) was formed in 2001. Support for Ålands Framtid is growing steadily: the 
party received 9.7% of the vote in the 2011 elections in Åland, gaining 3 seats in the 
30-strong Åland parliament (see Table 1).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
 
Even though some of the main ideological ‘party families’ are represented in Åland 
(primarily the Centre and Social Democratic parties), Finnish parties do not compete 
on the island and they only have very loose relations, if any at all, with their Ålandic 
counterparts. Out of all the parties, the Åland Social Democrats have the closest ties 
to the Social Democrat Party of Finland; however, it is an entirely separate party and 
not a ‘department’ of the Finnish Social Democrats. The reason for this, is that “the 
Ålanders were always suspicious that we were being ruled from outside. So all the 
parties here are independent” (Interview with Barbro Sundback). The relationship 
between the Åland and Finnish Social Democrats can therefore be likened to the 
cordial relations between the German SPD and the French Parti socialiste as party 
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representatives of two different countries, rather than, say the working relationship 
between the Walloon and Flemish Christian Democrats in the federal state of 
Belgium.  
The Åland Centre Party also has some relations with the Finnish Centre Party, 
whereby the Åland party may ask for support from their Finnish counterparts in trying 
to pass legislation. However, there is no formal cooperation between the parties. As 
Roger Nordlund MP says, “we have some contacts…. but when we visit their 
congress we are greeted as foreign guests” (Interview, 15 June 2010). Indeed, the 
Åland Centre Party has traditionally eschewed sitting with the Finnish Centre Party in 
the Parliament; instead, it traditionally caucuses with the Swedish People’s Party. 
Nordlund argues that the SPP “are a part of the government and that is very important 
because that’s the way to get a direct channel to power”. Indeed, the Åland MP has 
always sat with the SPP Finnish parliamentary grouping, regardless of his/her party 
affiliation. This is because Åland parties have no direct counterparts in Finland, and 
the SPP comes the closest to Åland’s interests in protecting the Swedish language. 
Åland’s other big party – the Liberals – have no natural ‘ideological’ sister-
party. However, the Liberals in Åland have also developed informal relations with the 
Swedish People’s Party (SPP). Clearly, these are two very different parties with 
different support bases. While there are no formal connections between the two 
parties, the Liberals – like the Centre party – have tended to use the SPP to get their 
interests heard in the Finnish Parliament. As Folke Sjölund MP says, “usually in 
issues that we have to take up in the Finnish Government or in the Finnish Parliament, 
we usually use as a channel, the Swedish People’s Party… the good thing is that the 
Swedish People’s Party usually sits in the Government and that is the most important 
way to influence, of course” (Interview, 15 June 2010). All of Åland’s MPs have to 
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date sat with the Swedish People’s Party grouping in the Finnish Parliament. Two 
other centre-right parties have also pledged support to SPP nominees in Finnish 
parliamentary elections: the Moderates and the Non-aligned coalition. In contrast, the 
Åland Social Democrats have pledged to sit with the Finnish Social Democrats if they 
won a Finnish parliament election. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
The fact that the Åland and Finnish parties are completely separate means that there is 
formal permanent incongruence between the Åland and Finnish governments: Åland 
governments have always been led by different parties to Finnish governments. 
However, there are two caveats to this incongruence.  
Firstly, Åland MPs – regardless of their own Åland party affiliation – have 
always sat with the SPP in the Finnish Parliament. As the SPP has nearly always been 
a member of Finnish coalition governments, this means that Åland MPs have always 
been a part of Finnish governments. As such, there is a degree of ‘informal’ 
congruence between Åland and Finland based on the Åland MP sitting with the SPP 
as a coalition government member. It should be noted, however, that despite being a 
member of coalition governments, the SPP has never been large enough to set broad 
government policy, while the voice of a single Åland MP in a large government 
coalition tends to be inadequate. Therefore, this SPP link has limited effectiveness in 
augmenting cooperation between the Åland and Finnish governments. 
The second caveat is that on occasion, the parties in power in Åland have been 
of the same ideological persuasion as the parties in government in Finland. This was 
the case in 2003-2007 when Centre parties ‘led’ both the Ålandic and Finnish 
coalition governments (see Table 3). However, based on the interviews conducted by 
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the author, there is no indication that a shared party ideology between Åland and 
Finnish parties has been led to greater cooperation. Indeed, in the case of the Centre 
party ideological congruence, the Åland Centre chose to sit with another party – the 
SPP – in the Finnish parliament rather than its ideological counterpart. This indicates 
that the territorial and cultural interests of Åland’s political parties take precedence 
over their ideological positions. As such, partial ideological incongruence also has 
limited explanatory power in explaining Åland-Finland relations. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
 
Despite this, there is evidence of a great deal of replication of many Finnish social 
policies in Åland, especially with regard to healthcare. This indicates that there is a 
degree of consensus between Åland and Finnish parties over welfare state policy. As 
Erland maintains “I think we have a lot of things coming from Finland… we have 
been in a way very wise to copy instead of trying to experiment” (Interview, 15 June 
2010). However, Åland and Finnish parties have very different views on protecting 
Åland’s economic, cultural and territorial autonomy. Here it is important to note that 
all of Åland’s parties – to varying degrees – support increased autonomy for the 
islands, in particular fiscal and cultural autonomy. These concerns are, 
understandably, not at the forefront of Finnish parties’ policy programmes (with the 
exception, to some extent, of the Swedish People’s Party), and in some cases are 
opposed by Finnish parties. The divergence in views on how to best protect Åland’s 
autonomy has brought the two governments to a head on several occasions. 
 There have been several headline-grabbing issues in the last few years that 
have soured relations between Åland and Finland. One issue is gambling and the 
lottery, which is a thriving part of Åland’s economy. Until the arrival of internet 
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gaming, Åland’s lottery association had a monopoly over Åland, while the Finnish 
lottery association had a monopoly over mainland Finland. However, when the Åland 
lottery started to attract players from Finland (and Sweden) this produced tensions 
with the Finnish lottery. In 2009, the Centre Party-led Finnish government announced 
a major reform of the Finnish Lotteries Act to resolve this issue, which was 
vehemently opposed by the Åland government, led by the Liberals. The legality of 
internet gambling accessible outside the territory of Åland is still an unresolved 
controversy (Åkermark, 2009). However, it is clear that Åland perceives the Finnish 
government’s actions as interfering with, and negatively impacting, Åland’s economy. 
Another area of tension is taxation. As the Åland economy is performing better than 
the Finnish economy as a whole (with a higher GDP than the Finnish average), many 
Åland politicians have begun to demand an end to the unfavourable lump sum that 
Åland receives from Helsinki, and full fiscal autonomy. Olof Salmen, former Deputy 
Premier of Åland during 1999-2001 (Non-aligned Coalition), recalls his conversations 
with his Finnish counterparts on this issue, who were part of a Social Democrat-led 
coalition government: “[We asked] why can’t we do this? We’ll take care of all the 
taxes and pay you for the services you give us?’ And first they [the Finns] said 
nothing but then after a while they said, “We cannot allow you to have this. You’ll be 
a tax paradise” (Interview, 18 June 2010). Despite this failed attempt, many Åland 
parties – in particular the Moderates, Centre, Future and Non-aligned parties – are still 
pushing for greater fiscal autonomy from Finland. 
Tensions have also emerged on EU issues. By far the most controversial issue 
was the EU’s attempts to abolish local legislation on the consumption of ‘snus’ 
(mouth tobacco), which was banned by the EU in every member-state except Sweden. 
Snus is highly popular in Åland, and is seen as part of its (Swedish) cultural heritage 
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as well as an important economic product (Karlsson, 2009: 145). Åland wanted to 
continue selling snus as a tax-free product on its ferries; however this was overruled 
by the European Commission. When Finland was called to the European Court of 
Justice to explain its position in 2006, instead of defending Åland, Finland agreed that 
Åland had breached the ban, and said it should change its laws. Åland’s MP in the 
Finnish Parliament, Elizabeth Nauclér, expressed her anger with Finland for not doing 
enough to fight for the islands’ interests in Europe (Dowling, 2008). Furthermore, the 
Åland government threatened to reject the Lisbon treaty if the EU did not allow them 
to continue selling the product on board their ferries. While Finland ignored Åland 
and formally ratified the Lisbon Treaty in 2008, the Treaty was intentionally held up 
in committee stage in the Åland Lagting for fifteen months before final approval. 
Importantly, this disagreement occurred at a time when the Centre party was the 
leading coalition governments in both Åland and Finland (see Table 3). 
This analysis demonstrates that party incongruence between the governments 
of Åland and Finland, even if parties are of broadly the same ‘party families’ or the 
Åland MP sits with the SPP government coalition partner, has not led to improved 
IGR. While Åland governments may be content to adopt similar social policies as 
Finland, when it comes to issues of Åland’s autonomy – in particular, its cultural and 
economic interests – Åland parties have had no qualms adopting a highly combative 
strategy with the Finnish Government. Given the constitutional protection that Åland 
enjoys as a federacy, Åland parties know that their antagonistic approach with 
Helsinki cannot result in the suspension of self-rule, or other means of punishing 
Åland for not complying with Finnish government policy. This confirms the 
hypothesis laid out at the start of the article. 
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Furthermore, we have seen that complete incongruence between Åland and 
Finnish political parties means that parties cannot act as a ‘lubricant’ for IGR, in the 
sense of helping to seal negotiations through party back-channels, as happens in many 
other federalized and regionalized states. For instance, we saw that despite the Centre 
Party being in power in both Åland and Finland during the late 2000s, this did not 
prevent the worst rift in Åland-Finnish history occurring over the banning of an 
Ålandic cultural pastime: chewing snus. This leads us to surmise that, even if parties 
generally have good working relations, if an issue of Åland’s culture or autonomy is 
under threat, then Åland parties’ territorial interests take precedence over ideology. 
 
Conclusion 
As an autonomous unit with constitutionally entrenched self-rule but comparatively 
weak shared-rule at the centre, Åland is very much cut off from politics in Finland. 
This is a common issue for federacies – the vast majority of which constitute island 
regions – whereby the multilevel architecture leans heavily towards autonomy and 
institutional self-rule. Although the centre and the federacy share sovereignty, the 
weak and indirect shared-rule arrangements diminish the subunit’s strength towards 
the centre – which was clearly evident in Åland in relation to European policies. 
Åland’s weak voice in national decision-making has put significant strains on 
Åland-Finland relations, especially in matters of significance to Åland’s cultural 
identity. Åland relies on formal bilateral channels to influence Finnish decision-
making, however, while constitutionally guaranteed, in practice these channels are 
often ineffective. This is, firstly, because some of these channels are little used: there 
are few and irregular meetings between heads of governments and senior ministers. 
Secondly, there are linguistic barriers to their effectiveness: Ålanders are 
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constitutionally obligated to communicate with the Finnish authorities in Swedish, 
which is impeded when their Finnish counterparts cannot speak their language. 
Thirdly, formal relations are hindered by their bilateral nature: there are no other 
regions to liaise and collaborate with, which might strengthen the positions of regions 
vis-à-vis the state in other federalized scenarios. The lack of joint decision-making 
structures means that Åland has minimal input into national law-making. In that 
sense, the practice of IGR between Åland and Finland resembles regionalized states. 
Despite being ‘equal partners’ on paper, it is not an equal partnership in practice.  
Yet, what advantages Åland and distinguishes it from regionalized units are 
the constitutionally entrenched powers of Åland. The Autonomy Act cannot be 
amended by the Finnish Parliament without Åland’s consent, and the Finnish 
Parliament must gain Åland’s consent before it signs international treaties (Joenniemi, 
2003: 90). In short, Finland is unable to revoke the Ålandic autonomy. However, 
there is one important caveat: the problem of ‘autonomy leakage’ caused by European 
integration. Here, competences are transferred to Brussels without any compensation 
for Åland in the form of EU representation. While Finland has sought to appease 
Åland by giving it greater input into Finnish EU policy-making, the central state can, 
and has, used its dominant position to override Åland’s interests in Europe, as was the 
case in the controversial snus incident. The unequal nature of interest representation 
on European integration indicates that a (constitutionally unforeseen) shadow of 
hierarchy has blighted Åland’s relations with Finland on this matter.  
There are, however, other benefits to Åland’s federacy relationship with 
Finland. And that is the ability of Åland political parties to pursue their territorial 
demands in Finland without fear of reprisal. Åland’s parties have adopted a combative 
approach with the Finnish authorities where the cultural and economic interests of 
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Åland were at stake. This is a much stronger situation than substate units in 
regionalized states, which may be forced to cooperate with state authorities to avoid 
fear of repercussions – i.e. by suspending self-rule. It is also clear that the separate 
political parties operating in Åland mean that they cannot be used as an informal 
channel of intergovernmental relations, or as a ‘whip’ by which to ensure compliance 
with government demands. The independence of Åland political actors means that 
they are not beholden to national interests, which make for smooth sailing if there are 
no tensions between the two units. However, in the case that Åland’s government is 
required to contest Finnish decision-making, intergovernmental coordination will 
continue to be hamstrung by Kafka-like linguistic miscommunication unless the two 
‘equal partners’ find a better way to speak to each other.  
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Table 1: Åland and Finnish Parties, Seats in Parliament and Ideology 
 
Åland Finland 
Party 
Seats 2011 
in Parl. 
(30 total) 
Ideology Party 
Seats 2011 
in Parl. 
(200 total) 
Ideology 
Åland 
Centre 
7 (23%) Centrist and 
Agrarian  
National 
Coalition 
Party 
44 (22%) Liberal 
Conservative 
Liberals for 
Åland 
6 (20%) Liberal Social 
Democratic 
Party of 
Finland 
42 (21%) Social 
Democratic 
Åland Social 
Democrats 
6 (20%) Social 
Democratic  
True Finns 39 (19%) Populist 
nationalist 
Moderates 
of Åland 
4 (13%) Liberal 
Conservative 
Centre Party 35 (17%) Centrist and 
Agrarian 
Non-aligned 
Coalition 
4 (13%) Conservative Left 
Alliance 
12 (6%) Left-wing 
Future of 
Åland 
3 (10%) Nationalist 
separatist 
(Liberal 
Conservative) 
Green 
League 
10 (5%) Green 
 Swedish 
People’s 
Party 
9 + 1 Åland 
member 
(5%) 
Swedish-
speaking 
minority 
(Liberal) 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Loose Ties between Åland and Finnish parties 
Åland Finland 
Åland SDP Finnish SDP  
Åland Centre Finnish Centre/Swedish People’s Party 
Åland Liberals Swedish People’s Party 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Åland and Finnish Coalition Governments 1999-2011  
Year Åland* Finland* 
2011 Four-party rainbow coalition (Åland 
Social Democrats, Åland Centre, 
Non-aligned Coalition, Moderates) 
Six-party rainbow coalition 
(National Coalition, Social 
Democratic Party, Green League, 
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Swedish People’s Party, Christian 
Democrats, Left Alliance) 
2007 Two-party centre coalition (Liberals 
for Åland, Åland Centre) 
Four-party rainbow coalition (Centre 
Party, National Coalition, Green 
League, Swedish People’s Party) 
2003 2005-2007 Three-party rainbow 
coalition (Åland Centre, Moderates, 
Åland Social Democrats) 
 
2003-2005 Four-party centre-right 
coalition (Åland Centre, Moderates, 
Liberals, Non-aligned Coalition) 
Three-party rainbow coalition 
(Centre Party, Social Democratic 
Party, Swedish People’s Party) 
1999 2001-2003 Two-party centrist 
coalition (Åland Centre, Liberals) 
 
1999-2001 Three-party centre-right 
coalition (Åland Centre, Moderates, 
Non-aligned Coalition) 
Five-party rainbow coalition (Social 
Democrats, National Coalition, Left 
Alliance, Green League, Swedish 
People’s Party) 
1995 Two-party centre-right coalition 
(Åland Centre, Moderates of Åland) 
Five-party rainbow coalition (Social 
Democrats, National Coalition, Left 
Alliance, Green League, Swedish 
People’s Party) 
* The party of the Premier of Åland and Prime Minister of Finland (representing the largest party in the 
coalition government) are highlighted in bold 
 
